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Abstract 
The ongoing debate about the future of EU cohesion policy includes the voices of critics 
questioning its effectiveness, as well as those praising its contribution to regional development 
policy. The proponents specifically acclaim its enhancement of inter-institutional cooperation 
and coordination in the delivery of the regional development policy through the partnership 
principle. However, the legacy of centralism, lack of traditions in collaborative policy-making, 
and weakly institutionalized sub-national authorities in Central and Eastern Europe prompt 
questions about the transferability of the partnership approach to the new member states, the 
main recipients of cohesion funding. What is the impact of EU cohesion policy’s partnership at 
the sub-national level? What are the mechanisms of the sub-national actors’ adjustment to this 
EU-imposed practice and what is the scope for its institutionalization? By investigating sub-
national partnership arrangements in Poland, the paper sheds light on these under-researched 
issues. It also offers a valuable contribution to the debates on the future of EU cohesion policy 
and the logic of the domestic policy actors’ adjustment to externally imposed policy norms. 
 
The paper draws on the concept of Europeanization, understood as the domestic impact of EU 
policies, to examine the implementation of a horizontal partnership in an unprecedented way by 
focusing on the strategies, preferences, and attitudes of the sub-national actors involved. It 
reveals that initially their adjustment to EU cohesion policy’s partnership tends to be strategic 
and interest-driven. Nevertheless, there is also evidence that partnership can be internalized over 
time provided that it is in line with the actors’ interests and there are specific incentives for 
cooperation. These findings show that strategic adjustment of domestic actors to European 
policy framework does not exclude socialization and internalization of the related norms and 
practices, as these processes can indeed be intertwined. 
 
General note: 
Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of post-crisis public spending cuts, EU cohesion policy, which absorbs the lion’s 
share of EU budget, is an object of an increasingly heated debate revolving around the issues 
of its effectiveness and impacts. The policy attracts criticism on the grounds of its 
questionable contribution to bridging the development gap between the regions of the EU, 
excessive bureaucracy, and the fact that the new member states are its principal beneficiary at 
the expense of the cash-strapped net contributors to the EU budget. In response to such 
critiques, the proponents of EU cohesion policy advance arguments about its added value for 
the member states and positive spin-offs for policy practice and the domestic institutions 
involved in its implementation (Leonardi, 2006; Mairate, 2006).  
EU cohesion policy not only offers unprecedented opportunities for boosting regional 
economic development in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and decreasing 
the development gap with Western Europe, but also involves pressures for major changes in 
their domestic regional development policies and administrative structures. In fact, the 
prospect of gaining access to EU structural funds (SF) stimulated development of regional 
policies in CEECs, while the adjustment to the EU cohesion policy framework and its 
subsequent implementation lead to diffusion of new policy norms and practices within the 
territorial administration (Hibou and Bafoil, 2003; Ferry, 2007; Hughes et al., 2004; Keating, 
2006; EPRC, 2009). In particular, by enforcing the partnership principle - one of the 
governing rules of the SF1 - EU cohesion policy has the potential (and ambition) to promote a 
multi-level and participative mode of governance in the member states. 
The partnership principle has attracted considerable attention of scholars considering EU 
cohesion policy and its cooperative mode of implementation as a test bed for multi-level 
governance in the EU (Hooghe, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bache and Flinders, 2004). In 
fact, the principle requires close cooperation between the European Commission, the 
authorities at national, regional, and local levels in the member states from program 
formulation to its management and monitoring. Over time, the horizontal dimension of 
partnership was strengthened by the inclusion of a plethora of regional stakeholders as well as 
economic and social partners in the policy process. The EU cohesion policy’s partnership 
principle created particularly strong pressures for institutional and policy changes in CEECs, 
being at odds with their long-standing traditions of centralized administration and policy 
implementation. As a consequence, the implementation of the SF impacted upon the center-
periphery relations in the new member states, creating scope for a growing role of the regional 
                                          
1See Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999, laying down general provisions on the Structural 
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tier and greater bottom-up regional involvement in economic development policy (Bachtler 
and McMaster, 2008; Bruszt, 2008; Baun and Marek, 2008).  
However, existing studies highlight numerous adjustment problems to the EU cohesion policy 
framework and implementation of the SF in CEECs (Baun and Marek, 2008; Kozak, 2007; 
Paraskvopoulos and Leonardi, 2004), predominantly as a result of limited learning and 
adaptation capacity of the domestic institutions involved. This casts doubts over the 
transferability of the partnership approach to the Central and Eastern European context. 
These developments also chime with the arguments advanced in the literature on 
Europeanization in CEECs.  According to this literature, institutional legacies of the 
communist period and the nature of the conditionality-driven adjustment to EU requirements 
would preclude mechanisms of socialization with the EU-imported policy rules (Grabbe, 
2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). This in turn would lead to ‘shallow’ 
Europeanization (Czernielewska et al., 2004) and creation of institutions lacking in ‘substance’ 
and in policy impact (Grabbe, 2006). Yet, some authors advanced a hypothesis that once these 
countries become members of the EU, the sociological mechanisms of Europeanization could 
become more prominent over time. Hence, after the accession domestic actors would become 
involved in implementation of EU policies and gain an opportunity to learn and socialize in 
the new EU-imposed policy environment (Goetz, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2006; Bafoil and Surel, 
2008). This could lead to gradual internalization of EU-imported practices, which in turn 
would favor effective implementation of EU policies in question.  
Nevertheless, given the scarcity of studies investigating the application of partnership as part 
of EU cohesion programs in CEECs after their accession, it remains unclear what the depth of 
changes introduced in response to this new approach and the degree of its institutionalization 
within the regional development policy systems in these countries. In particular, there is a 
shortage of research on the implementation of horizontal partnership at the sub-national 
level. In a situation where partnership is considered by the domestic actors as an irksome 
duty, it may be counter-productive. By contrast, internalization of the partnership approach 
by the domestic actors is a precondition for effective implementation of EU cohesion policy 
and creation of added-value through improved transparency and efficiency of regional policy-
making. What are the mechanisms for the sub-national actors’ adjustment to the partnership 
principle? Do they comply with the partnership principle reluctantly, considering it as an EU-
imposed rule being at odds with their ‘ways of doing things’? Or, is the partnership principle 
internalized over time and becomes an integral part of the domestic approach to regional 
development policy?  
The paper addresses the above questions by drawing on a qualitative study of the sub-national 
actors’ strategies, preferences and attitudes towards partnership in the context of 
implementation of EU cohesion policy in Poland. It tests the abovementioned hypotheses of Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 6 of 28 
‘shallow’ Europeanization and gradual shift from ‘strategic’ adjustment to the EU policy rules 
towards the internalization of these rules. The findings of this study resonate well with the 
argument advanced by March and Olsen (1998), which follows that both behavioral logics, the 
logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness are complementary. As they argue, 
any action most likely involves elements of both strategic pursuit of one’s interests and 
obeying the rules that the actors consider as appropriate and legitimate, even though “the 
relationship between the two is often subtle” (March and Olsen 1998, 952). This article 
presents new empirical evidence which sheds more light on this relationship. 
The key finding of this study is that the logic of the Polish sub-national actors’ responses to 
the partnership principle can shift from strategic and interest-driven adjustment towards 
social learning and internalization. The actors studied initially tended to get involved in 
partnership, either because they were obliged to do so or because it was necessary to gain 
access to EU funding, which often resulted in superficial change of practices.  Nonetheless, the 
study also reveals that socialization and learning mechanisms can indeed become more 
prominent over time – provided that the domestic actors consider it as being in line with their 
preferences. Thus, involvement in partnership in many cases leads to a gradual internalization 
of this new mode of operation: the actors tended to express positive opinions about 
partnership as a ‘good practice’ useful for improving their ‘end product’ (i.e. delivering a 
better policy, carrying out a more impactful project) and in some cases they continued 
cooperating with their new partners as part of other initiatives, also beyond the Structural 
Funds. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section will review the 
existing research on the impact of EU cohesion policy on the domestic policy actors involved 
in its implementation, with an emphasis on the role of the partnership principle. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the concept of Europeanization in studies focusing on the impact 
of EU cohesion policy and an explanation of the research design used in this study. The 
subsequent empirical section will present the evidence from research on partnership as part of 
the SF programs in Poland, which will be followed by concluding remarks on transferability of 
the partnership approach to CEECs and mechanisms of post-accession Europeanization at the 
sub-national level. 
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2. THE PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE: PROMOTING MULTI-LEVEL AND 
PARTICIPATORY POLICY-MAKING 
Many commentators (Ferry, 2007; Hughes et al., 2004; Keating, 2006; Marek and Baun, 2008) 
stressed the influence of the SF on the establishment and development of regional policy in 
Poland and other CEECs. In addition, the SF has been credited for generating ‘operational-’ 
and ‘learning added-value’ (Bachtler and Taylor, 2003) by supporting improvement of 
administrative capacity and catalyzing processes of modernization of administration involved 
in their management. This is achieved through the imposition of new standards and 
organizational practices, echoing the New Public Management paradigm and promoting a 
strategic approach to developmental projects (EPRC, 2009; DG REGIO, 2010).  
Yet, it is the EU cohesion policy’s partnership principle which has the most far-reaching 
impact on the domestic administration involved in regional policy delivery and the mode of 
governance. The partnership principle has been praised for improving administrative actors’ 
institutional capacity and creating opportunities for boosting innovation and learning across 
organizational boundaries (Kelleher et al., 1999). Moreover, by imposing cooperation between 
a variety of institutions as part of the policy process, the partnership principle has the 
potential for inducing an important shift in the patterns of governance, particularly in the 
CEECs (Bachtler and McMaster, 2008; Bruszt, 2008) and South-East Europe (Bache et al., 
2011) where traditionally policy-making tends to be based on centralized decision-making, 
relatively isolated institutions that concentrate on their particular restrained fields of activity 
and a lack of openness towards the influence of non-state actors.   
That said, the application of partnership varies considerably across the member states. Studies 
focusing on EU15 show that long-established traditions of cooperation between public and 
non-state actors in countries such as Ireland (Adshead, 2005) or Scotland (Danson et al., 
1999) facilitate compliance with the partnership principle. By contrast, in traditionally 
centralized countries with hardly any experience of collaborative and inclusive policy-making, 
such as Greece (Getimis and Grigoriadou, 2004) or Portugal (Nanetti, 2004), partnership is 
undermined by the weakness of local governments dependent on the state and weak 
organization of non-state actors. Yet, even in those countries one can observe incremental 
learning of partnership working with growing experience of the actors involved (Nanetti, 
1996; Kelleher et al., 1999; Getimis and Grigoriadou, 2004), which could eventually allow for 
overcoming of the difficulties linked with the prevailing political culture.  
Similar conclusions are drawn from research focused on CEECs sharing a legacy of 
centralized administration, the lack of cooperative policy-making traditions, and have 
relatively low administrative capacity, all of which were likely to hamper the functioning of Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 8 of 28 
partnership institutions (Hibou and Bafoil, 2003; Marek and Baun, 2008; Czernielewska et al., 
2004; Dabrowski, 2010). As a consequence, the policy actors’ adjustment to EU-imposed 
norms that refer to inclusion of stakeholders in decision-making or transparency could 
remain superficial (McMaster and Bachtler, 2005). Partnership implementation could also be 
prone to irregularities due to incompetence, lack of trust and high levels of corruption 
(Grosse, 2007; Brennek, 2007). In other words, one can express doubts about the potential for 
the successful transfer and institutionalization of partnership to the new member states. 
Indeed, the partnership approach “assumes a political commitment, capacity, and resources at 
[the regional level, which may not exist” in the Central and Eastern European context 
characterized by "long-standing traditions of centralized, sectoral policy making, while the 
regional institutional capacity is often weak” (Bachtler and McMaster, 2008: 402). 
 
3. EUROPEANIZATION AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF EU COHESION POLICY 
The impact of EU cohesion policy on domestic regional policy and institutions is often 
analyzed using the concept of Europeanization (Hughes et al., 2004; Ferry, 2007; Mendez et 
al., 2008; Bache et al., 2011). The term is most often understood as the influence of European-
level public policies on the domestic policies, institutions and politics of the member states, 
the outcome of which depends on the way the European policy framework is institutionalized 
and interpreted according to embedded domestic institutional arrangements and the actors’ 
preferences (for a review see Graziano and Vink 2007, Sedelmeier 2011). In the context of 
CEECs, Europeanization can also be considered as a positive external shock for the established 
domestic structures, triggering administrative restructuring and construction of institutional 
capacities, both at national and sub-national levels of government (Paraskevopoulos and 
Leonardi, 2004). The concept of Europeanization draws heavily on the insights of the new 
institutionalism, particularly its sociological and rational-choice variants (Hall and Taylor, 
1996). Thus, one can distinguish between rationalist mechanisms of Europeanization and 
sociological mechanisms of Europeanization (see e.g. Bӧrzel and Risse, 2003). In the case of 
the former, EU policies change the domestic opportunity structures, and the domestic actors’ 
responses to EU policies are based on cost/benefit calculations or are driven by constraint. 
This corresponds to the logic of consequentiality, whereby actors change their behavior 
strategically in a new policy context. By contrast, through sociological mechanisms of 
Europeanization - reflecting the logic of appropriateness - EU policy rules affect the domestic 
actors’ preferences and are internalized through processes of social learning.  Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 9 of 28 
It can be argued, however, that EU cohesion policy affects domestic policy actors through a 
combination of different mechanisms (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002; Radaelli, 2003). It imposes 
a specific policy framework on the member states’ managing authorities, who distribute the 
SF, involving Europeanization by compliance with EU-imposed rules. Moreover, the SF 
reflects the `carrot and stick` logic, which involves offering rewards for compliance with their 
rules. Thus, the availability of the SF creates a new opportunity structure by providing a novel 
source of funding for public (e.g. local authorities) and private actors of regional policy 
(NGOs, firms) who may choose to apply for it, which in turn would oblige them to comply 
with the SF-related norms imposed as part of the funding eligibility criteria. Lastly, EU 
cohesion policy has a normative dimension and explicitly aims at transforming the domestic 
patterns of governance via the partnership approach, which can alter the domestic policy 
actors’ beliefs and preferences. 
While the issue of pre-accession Europeanization in CEECs has been thoroughly explained 
(Hughes et al., 2004; Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) – highlighting the 
role of rational choice mechanisms of adjustment to external incentives – there are few studies 
exploring the patterns of Europeanization after accession. The existing studies revealed 
problems with application and internalization of EU rules imposed on them as part of the pre-
accession conditionality due to the limited effectiveness of institutional arrangements hastily 
put in place in response to Brussels’ requirements (Goetz, 2005; Bugaric, 2006; Pridham, 2008; 
Falkner and Treib, 2008). Consequently, the conditionality-based ‘hard’ transfer of EU rules 
was driven mainly by rationalist mechanisms of Europeanization and did not leave much 
room for institutionalization of these rules by the involved policy actors (Grabbe, 2006; 
Sedelmeier, 2006; Bӧrzel, 2006). This could result in producing new institutions that are not 
be ‘filled with substance’ (Bugaric, 2006). Concerning specifically EU cohesion policy, the 
limited learning capacity of the domestic policy actors, combined with the legacy of 
centralized and inflexible administration, was expected to result in ‘shallow’ Europeanization 
(Czernielewska et al., 2004) or superficial change ‘on the margins’ (Bruszt, 2008). However, 
some authors hypothesized that sociological mechanisms of Europeanization involving social 
learning, which were marginal in the pre-accession period, might come to the fore once the 
CEECs join the EU and their policy actors become actively involved in the implementation of 
EU policies (Goetz, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2006; Bafoil and Surel, 2008). This could favor 
internalization of EU policy norms, standards and ‘ways of doing things’ and hence improve 
the effectiveness of implementation of EU policies in the new member states. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This paper aims to test the above hypothesis through a qualitative investigation of the impact 
of the EU cohesion policy and its partnership principle in Poland. Unlike most studies on the 
domestic impact of EU cohesion policy, it focuses on the sub-national level of administration 
and the point of view of the regional and local actors’ involved in SF programs. In this 
research, EU cohesion policy framework and its partnership principle are considered as an 
independent variable, while the changes in the patterns of sub-national governance and in 
development policy practice are considered dependent variables. The study seeks evidence of 
adjustment to the EU cohesion policy’s partnership approach and aims to determine the 
mechanisms and depth of these changes. It also endeavors to identify the key intervening 
variables that affect these processes.  
As Bache argued, “understanding the type of learning that has taken place is the key to 
understanding whether Europeanization has been transformative or not” (2008, p. 18) In order 
to operationalize the mechanisms and depth of adjustment to EU cohesion policy framework, 
one should distinguish between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ learning (see Radaelli, 2003, p. 52). The 
former corresponds to a strategic reorientation of policy practices driven by constraint or 
interest, without changing their core features in order to accommodate EU-imposed policy 
rules (‘shallow’ change). By contrast, ‘thick’ learning involves internalization of EU-imposed 
practices, whereby these practices are considered as appropriate and become part of the 
actors’ mode of operation. This results in transformation of pre-existing ‘ways of doing things’ 
and a change in the actors’ preferences regarding a given policy (‘deep’ change).  
The study used three test variables to distinguish between rational choice and sociological 
mechanisms of Europeanization. First, the research investigated the actors’ motivation for 
adopting the partnership approach. Hence, adoption of partnership driven by the desire to 
acquire EU funds and/or obligation was considered as an indicator of strategic adjustment. By 
contrast, adoption of partnership corresponding to the actors’ desire to improve their policy 
practice and its outcomes was considered as an indicator of internalization of this EU-
imposed practice. Second, the actors’ perceptions of the usefulness and appropriateness of the 
partnership approach were considered as another indicator of sociological mechanisms of 
change and internalization of this new practice. Third, a further indicator of internalization of 
EU policy practices was their voluntary use outside of the SF programs or a given EU-funded 
project. Thus, the study sought evidence of spin-offs of the partnership approach, such as 
continuing cooperation of partners after the completion of a joint EU-funded project or use of 
the partnership approach in domestic policies and initiatives. 
The research was conducted in two contrasted regions of Poland, the main beneficiary of EU 
cohesion policy. Poland is also an interesting case study because of its relatively high degree of Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 11 of 28 
decentralization of territorial administration, which implies a more important role played by 
the regional authorities in management of the SF. The regions studied were Lower Silesia in 
the South-Western, more economically developed part of the country, and Lubelskie, Poland’s 
poorest region located in the East. The investigation was predominantly based on 72 semi-
structured interviews conducted within the institutions distributing the SF at the regional-
level, local authorities, and NGOs benefiting from EU funding as well as with officials from 
the Ministry of Regional Development and independent experts. In order to cross-check the 
findings from interviews, additional data was gathered from secondary sources, such as 
evaluation reports, strategic documents and press articles. 
Before proceeding with the empirical section, it is worth clarifying that the study focused on 
the 2004-2006 and the 2007-2013 programming periods. In the first period, the SF were 
implemented as part of six centrally managed sectoral OPs as well as the Integrated Regional 
Operating Program (IROP), the biggest program in budget terms. The IROP was managed 
centrally by the Ministry of Regional Development (MRD), but with participation of the 
Marshal Offices (MOs), which are elected regional authorities, and Voivod Offices (VOs) 
representing the central government in regions. In the subsequent programming period, a 
partial regionalization of SF management took place. Thus, the MOs took the responsibility 
for preparation and management of the Regional Operating Programs (ROPs), which 
correspond to roughly a quarter of the funding allocated to Poland for 2007-2013.  
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5. PARTNERSHIP AS PART OF THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS PROGRAMS IN 
LOWER SILESIA AND LUBELSKIE REGIONS 
This section presents the empirical evidence on the impact of partnership in Lower Silesia and 
Lubelskie regions. First, it looks into the functioning of regional-level horizontal partnership 
in the management of the IROP and the inclusion of regional stakeholders in formulation of 
ROPs. Second, it discusses the evidence concerning partnerships as part of EU-funded 
developmental projects at the local level.  
5.1. Horizontal partnership: a mixed picture 
5.1.1. Stimulating new forms of cooperation between the regional actors 
Ensuring horizontal partnership in implementation of the SF at the regional level involved the 
establishment of the Regional Steering Committees (RSCs) and the Monitoring Committees 
(MCs) for the regional component of the IROP. Both institutions comprised representatives 
of the central government, regional and local authorities, as well as various non-state actors. 
The RSCs were involved in project appraisal; its members assessed and voted on 
recommendations for eventual changes in the ranking list of projects to receive funding 
established by the Panel of Experts.
2 The list of projects was initially approved by vote by the 
RSC, and was then reassessed by the Board of Voivodship (regional executive), which made 
the final decision on the choice of projects. The role of the RSCs was to make sure that the 
selected projects responded to the regions’ developmental needs and conformed to the 
priorities of the regional development strategy. These Committees, albeit negatively assessed 
by many interviewees for having limited powers and being affected by politicization, offered 
some limited opportunities for the regional stakeholders to exert an influence on decision-
making regarding implementation of regional development policy and distribution of 
European funds.
3 
The MCs were involved in the supervision of progress in achieving the IROP’s aims and the 
absorption of the allocated funds. They could also recommend changes in the procedures for 
the implementation of the program.
4 Despite some hurdles stemming from lack of 
preparation of its members, the MCs created an additional channel for participation of 
regional stakeholders in policy implementation and the assessment of their functioning was 
                                          
2 See IROP, p. 494. 
3 See also DWORAKOWSKA et al,. 2006:55-56. 
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more positive than that of the RSCs; 63 percent of officials interviewed expressed positive 
opinions about their effectiveness (EGO S.C., 2010, pp. 76-77). 
The imposition of the partnership principle as part of the SF framework also contributed to 
the increase in public consultations. The consultations of OPs for the 2004-2006 period were 
rather limited, particularly at the regional level, and consisted mainly of organizing 
information meetings for prospective beneficiaries. By contrast, the formulation of ROPs for 
2007-2013 period involved wide-spread consultations offering genuine opportunities for 
influencing the shape of the programs.   
Finally, in an indirect manner, the SF spurred new interactions between the regional policy 
stakeholders.  Participation in the emerging SF-oriented associations of local officials and in a 
variety of SF-related training courses and conferences created new opportunities to foster 
informal links and networks. These emerging networks were appreciated by the local 
authorities, who perceived them as useful forums for the dissemination of knowledge on the 
SF and ‘good practice’: 
 “When there is a training session, there may be 150 Mayors in the room […] there are 
opportunities to talk, exchange information, informal advice, hints. This is very 
important.”5 
5.1.2. Horizontal cooperation: necessary evil or useful practice? 
As an interviewee argued, partnership is “something very exotic in the Polish context”
6 and can 
be perceived as an unnecessary hassle. However, it is also Brussels’ requirement with which 
the institutions involved in administration of the SF programs must comply. This 
substantiates the argument that CEECs may not offer a favorable environment for partnership 
due to their long-standing traditions of centralized policy-making and weak institutional 
capacity of regional stakeholders. 
The Polish regional authorities reluctantly complied with the ministerial requirement to 
include the RSCs in the decision-making process, considering them as an obstacle for swift 
absorption of the allocated funds. Hence, the MOs welcomed the government’s decision to 
abandon the RSCs in the 2007-2013 programming period and to restrict the realization of the 
partnership principle to the MCs participating in establishment of the eligibility criteria for 
projects and monitoring of the ROPs. 
From the point of view of the members of the RSCs and MCs, in most cases, their 
participation in these partnership bodies was interest-driven. The representatives of local 
                                          
5 Interview: local official (Lubelskie).  
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authorities were motivated mainly by the prospects of potentially influencing decision-
making, lobbying in favor of their own projects, or obtaining valuable “first-hand 
information” 
7on how the projects were selected, helpful in obtaining grants. Some 
interviewees claimed that participation in the RSC or the MC was also a source of prestige, 
while only few of them argued that they were motivated by the desire to represent the interests 
of a wider group of their peers and exert social control on the distribution of EU funds.  
Regarding partnership in the formulation of ROPs, the interviewed representatives of MO 
affirmed that the EU-imposed consultations were a helpful means of gathering information 
and enhancing the connection between the region’s needs and the priorities outlined in the 
program. Thus, while partnership via the RSCs was perceived as a hassle, this aspect of 
partnership was seen as worthwhile and useful: 
 “We perceive the consultations as a means to improve our end product […] We think 
that this is a very good practice.”8 
 
Likewise, the majority of beneficiaries of the SF interviewed expressed positive opinions about 
the consultations of the ROPs, praising their inclusiveness and their positive impact in on 
promoting cooperative governance involving the regional stakeholders through various 
channels. Firstly, consultations of ROPs involved numerous meetings and conferences 
gathering sub-national officials and non-state actors. Secondly, the MOs collected informal 
input from various regional policy stakeholders and expert working groups comprising 
economic and social partners or academics. Finally, the ROPs were consulted via  online 
forums, where virtually any actor could submit suggestions and remarks regarding the 
program and the related guidelines for beneficiaries.  
One of the examples of influence exerted by local authorities was the introduction of 
revitalization of urban areas as one of the areas eligible for funding by the Lower Silesian ROP. 
Moreover, the consultations stimulated mobilization and cooperation by local actors. For 
example, unofficial consultation groups were organized by and between various stakeholders 
in Wałbrzych sub-region of Lower Silesia in order to foster common views and formulate 
recommendations regarding the ROP.  
Moreover, interaction and discussion among the regional policy actors during these 
consultations favored fostering relationships based on trust which were conducive to the 
exchange of knowledge and mutual understanding. This indicates that the partnership in 
program formulation involved dynamics of social learning. 
                                          
7 Interview: local official (Lower Silesia). 
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In short, the investigation of the actors’ responses to the horizontal partnership principle in 
the case study regions revealed an ambivalent picture. Formalized partnership in the RSCs 
was not internalized because it was at odds with the priority of swift implementation, suffered 
from irregularities, and its role in decision-making was very limited. This fuelled the 
dissatisfaction of the actors involved. Nevertheless, while the RSCs were far from being a 
‘success story,’ the findings on the inclusion of regional stakeholders in the formulation of the 
ROPs for the 2007-2013 period showed that the partnership principle could be successfully 
implemented in the Polish context. This form of partnership was internalized by the regional 
authorities and became an integral part of their approach to policy-making, because it was 
perceived as a useful practice. Moreover, unlike the RSCs, it was not conflicting with their 
priorities and interests. Partnership in program formulation was also internalized by the 
regional stakeholders. They perceived it as a beneficial practice offering ample possibilities for 
participation and, notably, making it possible to successfully influence the contents of the 
program ‘from below.’ However, the study found little evidence of a spill-over of partnership 
in policy formulation, apart from the increasing use of public consultations organized by the 
local authorities preparing their local development strategies. Nevertheless, “these are still 
more ‘consultations’ rather than ‘partnership’ (joint decision-making)” (EPRC, 2009, p. 64). 
5.2. Project-level partnerships: from reluctance to durable cooperation? 
5.2.1. Encouraging partnership-based projects 
The availability of structural funding after Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 also prompted 
new forms of cooperation between local actors as part of the EU-funded projects. Inter-
institutional partnerships were specified as potential beneficiaries of funding as part of the 
IROP.
9 Depending on the priority of the IROP, this could occur in the form of alliances 
between local authorities (e.g. infrastructural projects) or inter-sectoral partnerships that 
bring together public authorities, NGOs and/or firms (e.g. human resources development 
projects). In the case of the IROP and other OPs, partnership was not mandatory but merely 
mentioned as a possibility. That said, it was encouraged for projects that benefit from the 
European Social Fund (ESF) as part of Priority 2 of the IROP, and in some cases it was a 
precondition for receiving funding (e.g. in LEADER+ initiative). By contrast, partnership-
based projects were encouraged more explicitly in ROPs for 2007-2013 period. 
 
                                          
9 The eligible actors and eligibility criteria  for each of the IROP’s priorities are specified in an additional 
regulatory document entitled UzupełnienieZintegrowanegoProgramuOperacyjnegoRozwojuRegionalnego 2004-
2006 available from: http://www.zporr.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/9660670F-0909-43CC-9AF9-
B18757470C31/37191/ZPORR_uzupelnienie_03092007.pdf  [Accessed October 2010] Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 16 of 28 
5.2.2. The logic of adoption of the partnership approach to developmental 
projects 
During the 2004-2006 period, partnership-based projects involving several Communes were 
rather unpopular. Frequently, the local authorities lacked any experience in inter-institutional 
cooperation and did not see any purpose to getting involved in joint projects. Such projects 
are time-consuming and require increased efforts.10 Additionally, there were few incentives 
for partnerships in the project selection criteria for the IROP. 
Moreover, the popularity of partnership projects was further undermined by competition for 
structural funding between the local authorities and lack of trust in other actors. This quote 
summarizes this situation well: 
“There are hardly any partnership-based projects […] There are a lot of small projects 
spread around the region and they are not interconnected. […] Most often one 
Commune builds two kilometers of a road here, another one 3 kilometers there […] That 
is because people just did not understand the idea of partnership. Everyone preferred 
investing in their own backyard to make the inhabitants happy and boost the popularity 
of the local government.” 11 
 
In many cases, the decision to implement a project in partnership was made because 
partnership was required in a given scheme. Moreover, many of the partnership projects were 
somewhat ‘artificial’ since their only raison d’être was to obtain EU money. Such initiatives 
tended to fall apart as soon as the project terminated. Thus, given that in these cases 
introduction of partnership was motivated by external incentives – either by constraint or 
prospective financial gains – the emerging partnerships were often ‘institutions without 
substance’ (Bugaric, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the situation changed in the 2007-2013 period with the introduction of both 
explicit and implicit incentives for partnership-based projects to the ROPs.
12 Thus, additional 
points are attributed to cooperative projects and the threshold in terms of the projects’ impact 
on the region’s development is higher. This favors projects of greater value that cover a wider 
                                          
10Due to an overall emphasis on bureaucratic procedures and control (see EPRC, 2010; Dabrowski, 2010) these 
kind of projects required producing a substantial amount of additional documentation for each of the partners.  
11 Interview: Marshal Office (Lubelskie). 
12For instance, the Lower Silesian ROP highlights the opportunities for the region’s development stemming from 
partnership-based projects bringing together local authorities and NGOs (p. 47). Moreover, inter-institutional 
partnership is part of the eligibility criteria for funding in priority 6.5 concerning infrastructure for tourism and 
culture, while in priorities 2 (information society)  and 3 (transport) above-local impact is stated as a 
requirement, which creates incentives for pooling resources in bigger joint projects. Sources: 
http://dolnyslask.pl/upload/RPO/07_komitet_monitorujacy/posiedzenia/100909_kryteria_czysta.pdf 
http://dolnyslask.pl/upload/RPO/03_dokumenty_i_wytyczne/iz/rop_21_08_2007_en.pdf [Accessed October 
2010]. Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 17 of 28 
territory and puts small-scale projects and individual projects at a disadvantage. While a 
number of local authorities still prefer to apply for EU funds on an individual basis, these 
changes encouraged many of them to prepare partnership projects as part of inter-communal 
consortiums in order to boost their chances for obtaining a grant. 
Interestingly, the fact that the local authorities were encouraged to cooperate by prospective 
gain does not exclude processes of learning and gradual internalization of a cooperative 
approach to investment projects. There is evidence of learning and a growing awareness that 
partnership solve problems that could not be solved by an individual actor. The local 
authorities’ “approach to partnership is very pragmatic” and they become involved in such 
projects when they “can clearly see tangible economic benefits of such cooperation.”
13That said, 
for some local authorities involved in joint projects, the “partnership logic already becomes a 
natural way of operating,”14which is evidence of gradual internalization of this practice despite 
the initially interest-driven cooperation.  
In some cases, inter-communal cooperation can outlive the project’s intended purpose. Even 
though partnership can initially be motivated by the increased likelihood of obtaining funding 
(rational choice mechanism), the actors involved learn how to cooperate with each other, 
discover and appreciate the gains of collaboration, and build a more durable relationship, 
serving as “a platform for a more long-term cooperation”
15 (sociological mechanism). Such 
partnership experience can also involve mutual learning and exchange of know-how, which 
“can encourage cooperation in other fields, not only with a given project.”
16 Such continuing 
cooperation and use of the partnership approach beyond the implementation of EU-funded 
projects (e.g. in own developmental projects or inter-communal cooperation initiatives) 
demonstrates the possibility of internalizing partnership in Polish regions. Most importantly, 
perhaps, several interviewees argued that participation in successful partnerships fostered 
relationships based on trust, a major catalyst for further cooperation. This, in turn, indicates 
that partnership promoted as part of the SF framework can create conditions favorable to the 
building of social capital.  
5.3. Factors limiting the scope for diffusion of the partnership approach 
The study also reveals that the positive impact of the partnership principle on the Polish 
regional actors was limited by a set of domestic intervening variables corresponding to the 
embedded features of the Polish political and administrative culture. In other words, there are 
                                          
13 Interview: official at Voivod Office (Lubelskie). 
14 Interview: local official (Lower Silesia). 
15 Interview: local official (Lubelskie). 
16 Interview: employee of Regional Development Agency (Lower Silesia), similar opinions were expressed by 
employees of the Lower Silesian Marshal Office. Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 18 of 28 
still important barriers to wider diffusion and internalization of the partnership approach, 
which should be tackled by the policy-makers.  
5.3.1. Politicization and clientelism 
To begin with, the process of selecting projects to receive European funding remained affected 
by politicization and clientelism, hampering the functioning of partnership in implementation 
of the IROP. For example, in Lower Silesia in 2004 the newly appointed Board of Voivodship 
fired 8 out of 26 members of the RSC associated with the opposition, including representatives 
of local governments and NGOs (Majewska, 2004a). They were replaced by local leaders and 
representatives of organizations linked with the parties represented in the regional executive 
(Kokot, 2004).  
Furthermore, there were examples of blunt instrumental use of the SF by the regional 
authorities for satisfying the regional political clientele. For instance, decisions on distribution 
of grants taken by the Board of Voivodship often ignored the opinion of the RSC and were 
based on political criteria, as illustrated by developments in Lubelskie. This defied the purpose 
of horizontal partnership, which is supposed to ensure transparent and unbiased distribution 
of the SF in the regions. As a result, the members of Lubelskie’s RSC “understood that the 
Committee had no influence on the distribution of funds,”
17which lead to disillusionment as 
well as problems with ensuring a quorum. Likewise, the Lower Silesian Board of Voivodship 
made attempts to secretly influence the Panel of Experts, a body responsible for assessment of 
projects prior to voting in the RSC. The vice-Marshal arranged a meeting between the 
members of the panel and a regional politician, who was able to successfully lobby in favor of 
a bid for funding submitted by his company. Following the disclosure of these events in the 
media (Majewska, 2004b; Kokot, 2005) the vice-Marshal was forced to quit the RSC; 
nevertheless, the project in question still received the funding. 
Finally, the RSCs of both regions were themselves affected by favoritism and could serve as an 
arena for lobbying for one’s projects. As an interviewee suggested, projects of Communes 
represented in the RSC were more likely to obtain funding than those of other Communes 
which “lacked the capacity to be heard by the decision-makers.”
18 
In sum, due to the influence of politics and clientelistic networks, the RSCs were an example 
of institutions created as a result of adjustment to EU policy rules which formally complied 
with the partnership principle, in practice, their role was limited and their functioning 
remained rather awkward. 
                                          
17 Interview: local official (Lubelskie). 
18 Interview: official at Voivod Office (Lower Silesia). Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 19 of 28 
5.3.2. Mistrust and reluctance to cooperate with potential competitors 
Pervasive reluctance to cooperate, resulting from mistrust and competition for scarce EU 
funding, was another factor undermining the diffusion of partnership among the regional 
actors, as illustrated by this comment: 
“We still think that if one is to cooperate with someone then this person will do 
something funny, so one prefers to do things on one’s own.”19 
 
Such attitudes reflect the statistical data on the level of trust and perceptions of corruption in 
Poland. For instance, a study conducted by Czapiński and Panek (2007) showed that in 2007 
only 11.5 percent of Poles think that ‘most people can be trusted.’ In addition, 89 percent of 
Poles surveyed by CBOS (2009) declared that corruption was a big or a very big problem in 
Poland, while Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer20 indicated that in 
2009 Poles perceived the public administration as the sector most affected by corruption. 
Another barrier to diffusion of partnership-based developmental projects is competition for 
European grants, exacerbated by the predominant perception among the beneficiaries that the 
SF is mainly a new attractive source of funding for basic infrastructural needs. In such a 
context, partnerships are difficult, because, as one interviewee pointed out, “doing a project in 
partnership means less money for me.”
21 Consequently, most beneficiaries preferred to 
implement projects on their own to avoid sharing the acquired funds with partners. As argued 
above, however, the introduction of clear incentives for bigger inter-communal projects into 
the OPs during the 2007-2013 period encouraged many of the local authorities to cooperate 
instead of compete with one another. 
Similarly, competition for the SF among the local authorities also negatively affected 
interaction and collaboration between each other in order to exchange know-how or to agree 
on common positions in order to exert a greater influence on the process of consultations of 
the ROPs. Such cooperation tended to wane when new calls for projects were published and 
the Communes started competing with each other. Thus, the spirit of partnership could 
suddenly be replaced with the spirit of (often ruthless) competition precluding cooperation. 
 
                                          
19 Interview: NGO (Lower Silesia). 
20 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2009 [Accessed October 2010]. 
21 Interview: expert (Lower Silesia). Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 20 of 28 
5.3.3. Patchy participation in Structural Funds programs limiting the exposure 
to partnership 
Last but not least, roughly 22 percent of Polish local authorities did not acquire any EU 
funding in the 2004-2006 period (MRD, 2008) due to their lack of capacity or desire to 
participate in SF programs. Such local authorities were hardly exposed to the influence of the 
SF framework and the practices it promoted. They were also generally less interested in 
participating in events and activities linked with the SF, such as the consultations of the ROPs, 
which allowed for voicing one’s interests and served as a platform for engaging in new forms 
of inter-institutional cooperation. In fact, their mayors tended to assume that they would not 
be able to become beneficiaries of these programs. The evidence yielded by the interviews 
suggests that this inability or unwillingness to use the European funds by certain local 
authorities can be a matter of insufficient local funds to provide match-funding, insufficient 
administrative capacity to cope with preparation of a bid for funding, and/or a passive and 
risk-averse attitude of the mayor precluding efforts to apply for grants. 
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6. FROM ‘SHALLOW’ ADJUSTMENT TOWARDS GRADUAL 
INTERNALIZATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP APPROACH IN THE NEW 
MEMBER STATES? 
This paper investigates the Polish sub-national actors’ responses to the partnership approach 
promoted by the EU cohesion policy. By doing so, it examined the extent to which such a 
cooperative mode of policy implementation was transferrable to CEECs, and provided new 
empirical evidence on the mechanisms of post-accession Europeanization, and the logic of the 
domestic actors’ adjustment to the partnership principle.  
The study reveals that the imposition of the SF framework based on partnership prompted 
important changes in the mode of governance imposing increased interaction and 
cooperation between the policy actors at different levels of administration, from central to 
local. In conformity with the partnership principle, formal partnership-based institutions 
were put in place to allow for participation of regional policy stakeholders in project appraisal 
and program monitoring. In addition, widespread public consultations of the ROPs were 
organized to gather feedback from a variety of interested parties on the programs’ priorities 
and procedures. Moreover, despite an initial reluctance, the SF encouraged the local 
authorities to pool their resources and skills to conceive joint developmental projects. 
These results show that partnership can work in the Polish context, albeit with some caveats. 
On one hand, the study pointed to ‘formal’ and ‘shallow’ compliance with the partnership 
requirement in implementation of the SF, as in the case of partnership committees 
participating in project appraisal (RSCs). On the other hand, in other areas, as for example in 
program formulation, partnership was keenly adopted, which suggests that this new practice 
can be successfully transferred to the Polish policy arena, providing that the actors involved 
consider it in line with their interests and preferences. The same can be said about partnership 
in developmental projects among local authorities, which becomes increasingly popular as 
officials realize its potential to generate synergies and, more importantly perhaps, to increase 
the chances of obtaining funding.  
This points to the importance of efforts in improving awareness of the purpose and potential 
benefits of partnership as well as the clear incentives for cooperation in joint projects, in order 
to facilitate institutionalization of this approach in the new EU member states. The evidence 
suggests that the ‘carrot and stick’ approach characterizing the SF framework can be effective 
in promoting the partnership approach thanks to the learning dynamics that it stimulates. 
Thus, in countries lacking institutional capacity and traditions of cooperation, 
implementation of partnership-based regional development policy measures may not 
immediately produce the same results as in the Western European countries. However, as the Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 22 of 28 
findings from Lower Silesia and Lubelskie attest, such initiatives can still be effective as they 
create incentives for cooperation and favor building inter-institutional relations based on 
trust. In other words, in countries such as Poland, partnership-based policy may lack the 
social capital to draw upon, implying the possibility of initial difficulties in its 
implementation, but over time it can create conditions conducive to its development. These 
findings echo studies focusing on countries such as Greece or Portugal, suggesting that in 
places lacking cooperative political culture, working in partnerships can only develop 
incrementally and build upon growing experience of the policy actors involved (Kelleher et al., 
1999; Getimis and Gridoriadou, 2004). 
What do the findings presented in this article tell about post-accession Europeanization in 
CEECs? The study shows that the patterns of Europeanization are complex and may involve a 
mixture of rationalist and sociological mechanisms of adoption of EU policy rules. Thus, it 
provided new evidence on the interplay between the logic of consequentiality and the logic of 
appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1998) that guide the policy actors’ adjustment to 
externally imposed policy frameworks. Thus, working in partnerships initially tended to be 
adopted as a result of top-down constraints or in response to the opportunities that it created, 
corresponding to a rational-choice adjustment. For example, the regional authorities had to 
comply with the requirement imposed by the government to establish RSCs and thus share 
decision-making powers regarding distribution of the SF with regional stakeholders. Likewise, 
the new opportunities for acquiring European grants for developmental projects spurred new 
forms of cooperation between the local authorities preparing partnership-based bids for 
funding. These developments resonate with the model of Europeanization by external 
incentives (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005), whereby adoption of EU policy rules 
by the domestic actors is driven by constraints imposed as part of the policy framework 
and/or prospective rewards for adoption of these rules. 
The argument that adoption of EU rules by CEEC policy actors driven by constrain or interest 
remains superficial was partly confirmed by the findings from this study. When partnership 
was against the actors’ interests or preferences, they reluctantly complied with it, often 
implying purely ‘formal’ and ‘shallow’ adjustment. This type of adjustment was illustrated by 
the awkward functioning of the RSCs, considered to be façade institutions imposed from 
above, hindering swift disbursement of the SF. Similarly, some beneficiaries of the European 
funds considered partnership as part of EU-funded projects to be a ‘necessary evil,’ which one 
must accept in order to benefit from grants. 
As evidenced by the study, however, such rational-choice driven adoption of working in 
partnerships did not preclude gradual internalization of this new approach over time, showing 
that the logics of consequentiality and appropriateness can coexist and intertwine. 
Accordingly, horizontal and sociological mechanisms of Europeanization were gradually Working Paper No: 05/2011    Page 23 of 28 
becoming more prominent in cases where partnership was in line with the interests of the 
actors concerned and was perceived by them as beneficial and useful. For instance, inclusion 
of regional stakeholders in project appraisal hampered the regional authorities’ objective of 
rapid and effective absorption of funds. As a consequence, the RSCs were abandoned after the 
initial programming period. By contrast, the horizontal partnership formula was internalized 
and perceived as appropriate when it came to program formulation, because it matched the 
interests of the regional authorities, who were keen to take advantage of their suggestions to 
improve the program’s priorities and implementation procedures. In a similar fashion, 
internalization of inter-communal partnership as part of joint EU-funded projects was 
possible only after local officials realized, either through their own experience or by learning 
from the experiences of their peers, that such cooperation could help them gain access to the 
SF and implement developmental projects with a wider impact. While, in cases where local 
authorities did not see any tangible benefits to cooperation, they tended to steer clear of any 
form of partnership. 
Furthermore, the SF had other, rather indirect, influences on the patterns of interaction 
between the local authorities. As a spin-off of their involvement in SF programs, they started 
cooperating within the emerging inter-communal associations and informal forums, helping 
them to pursue their joint interests within the regional arena and to acquire knowledge and 
‘good practice’ used in managing EU-funded projects. This, in turn, is an example of 
horizontal dynamics of Europeanization inducing change without explicit adaptation pressure 
from above. 
Lastly, the findings presented in this paper show that the outcome of Europeanization may be 
multi-faceted, particularly in the case of policies such as EU cohesion policy affecting a variety 
of actors by different mechanisms, including imposition of a framework for implementation 
of the SF, provision of financial incentives, and normative influence. The actors involved in 
the policy process respond differently to the norms and practices promoted by EU cohesion 
policy, with some of them complying only superficially with them, while others internalize 
their logic. The ‘depth’ of their adjustment to the EU-imposed policy rules varies depending 
on their preferences and interests. It also depends on their capacity to participate in the SF 
programs, which is in turn determined by their financial and administrative capacity, as well 
as their attitudes. Moreover, their responses to EU-imposed policy norms may change over 
time. As a consequence, the impact of the partnership principle, and more widely the EU 
cohesion policy and the norms it promotes, remains uneven and differentiated across the 
affected sub-national policy actors. 22 
                                          
22 This research was funded in part by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies and was 
conducted as part of the author’s PhD thesis. The author would like to thank Martin Myant, Mike Danson and 
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